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Is artists’ perception more veridical?
Florian Perdreau* and Patrick Cavanagh
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Figurative artists spend years practicing their skills, analyzing objects, and scenes in order
to reproduce them accurately. In their drawings, they must depict distant objects as
smaller and shadowed surfaces as darker, just as they are at the level of the retinal image.
However, this retinal representation is not what we consciously see. Instead, the visual
system corrects for distance, changes in ambient illumination and view-point so that our
conscious percept of the world remains stable. Does extensive experience modify an
artist’s visual system so that he or she can access this retinal, veridical image better than
a non-artist? We have conducted three experiments testing artists’ perceptual abilities
and comparing them to those of non-artists. The subjects first attempted to match the
size or the luminance of a test stimulus to a standard that could be presented either
on a perspective grid (size) or within a cast shadow. They were explicitly instructed to
ignore these surrounding contexts and to judge the stimulus as if it were seen in isolation.
Finally, in a third task, the subjects searched for an L-shape that either contacted or did not
contact an adjacent circle. When in contact, the L-shape appeared as an occluded square
behind a circle. This high-level completion camouflaged the L-shape unless subjects could
access the raw image. However, in all these tasks, artists were as much affected by visual
context as novices. We concluded that artists have no special abilities to access early,
non-corrected visual representations and that better accuracy in artists’ drawings cannot
be attributed to the effects of expertise on early visual processes.
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Although most of us can hold a pencil and
draw shapes on a surface, as we do in writ-
ing, only a few of us can use the pencil to
accurately represent an object or a visual scene
(Tchalenko, 2009). Why is there such a dif-
ference in drawing accuracy across subjects?
According to Cohen and Bennett (1997), poor
accuracy in drawing has several sources: mis-
perception of the object, poor selection of the
object’s parts to be depicted, poor motor coor-
dination, and misperception of the inaccura-
cies already present in a drawing. Their results
suggested that misperceptions of the object
might be an important contributor to poor
drawing (Cohen and Bennett, 1997; Cohen and
Jones, 2008). The artists’ advantage may there-
fore lie in perceptual and cognitive skills that are
more appropriate for the requirements of draw-
ing: either a better, more vertical initial encoding
of the object or subsequent, learned cognitive
corrections. In this review, we will discuss both
alternatives, and we describe our experiments
(Perdreau and Cavanagh, 2011) that tested
whether artists’ perception is more veridical—
closer to the retinal image—and less affected
by the post-encoding corrections ordinarily
made by the visual system: the so-called visual
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constancies. In the end, we argue that artists do
not have any special perceptual expertise that
would allow them to access to their retinal image
or any learned strategies that recover that image.
Instead, we suggest that the artist’s advantage
may arise from more robust representations
of object structure in memory, representations
that are more appropriate to the visuomotor
demands of drawing.
THE ARTIST’S ADVANTAGE
One of the most difficult tasks in realistic draw-
ing is to convert a three-dimensional object or
scene into a two-dimensional representation on
a flat surface; that is, to represent the world as
it is projected onto the retina, the back of the
eye. Although visual processing starts with the
retinal image, it ends with conscious percep-
tion only after a long chain of corrections and
processes. The retinal image itself is constantly
changing because of environmental variations
in light or spatial position of the viewer. For
example, the retinal projection of a far object is
smaller than that of a near object, and the shape
of an object on the retina changes with view-
point and the amount of light it reflects changes
with ambient illumination. However, we do
not have this ever-changing experience of the
world. Instead, we perceive a remarkable visual
constancy, so that our final conscious percept
roughly matches the external (distal) world’s
Realistic Drawing
Here, we use the term “realistic
drawing” to refer to any visual arts,
whatever the medium, having the aim
of representing the world as accurately
as possible. It thus concerns practices
such as illustration, painting, or
drawing (in color or not).
Distal
The term “distal” corresponds to actual
properties (e.g., color, size, or shape)
belonging to the external world,
independent from the observers.
Proximal
“Proximal” refers to the retinal domain.
As such, it is still external, that is
non-relative to a subjective percept.
properties whatever the initial (proximal) reti-
nal image (Todorovic, 2002).
These constancies help us function in the
world, but an artist should not represent the
world as looks to us, but rather as it appears
on his or her retinas. For example, a distant car
should be drawn smaller than a nearby child,
even though we perceive the car as larger, and an
object lying in a shadow must be drawn much
darker than our subjective impression. How do
artists undo the perceptual constancies in order
to achieve their accuracy in drawing?
Numerous studies have investigated the pos-
sible origin of the difference in accuracy between
artists and non-artists (e.g., Cohen and Bennett,
1997; Kozbelt, 2001; Cohen, 2005; Mitchell
et al., 2005; Kozbelt and Seeley, 2007; Cohen and
Jones, 2008; Matthews and Adams, 2008) and
have reported a correlation between drawing
accuracy and perceptual performances in many
tasks. Notably, subjects who drew more accu-
rately in these studies were less affected by visual
contexts and visual constancies, making them
“experts in visual cognition” (Kozbelt, 2001).
Certainly the thousands of hours spent in train-
ing in visual arts create advanced skills, and this
expertise may change the artist’s visual process-
ing. Strong effects of expertise on visual and
memory processes have been reported in many
other contexts (Hubel and Wiesel, 1970; Chase
and Simon, 1973; Goldstone, 1998; Ostrovsky
et al., 2006; Green and Bavelier, 2008).
However, it has not been established yet how
this expertise enables visual artists to be less
influenced by visual constancies, if indeed they
are. Can they access an earlier, uncorrected rep-
resentation of the object close to the retinal
input—a modification of their visual process-
ing compared to non-artists? Or do they use
some learned strategies to later undo the cor-
rections made by the visual brain? These two
alternatives—direct access to the retinal image
vs. later compensation for visual constancies—
have long been disputed by art historians, espe-
cially by Ruskin (1912) and Gombrich (1960).
According to the former, visual artists must
train themselves with practical exercises and
by using external tools (e.g., the Dürer’s win-
dow) to access an “innocent eye,” not influ-
enced by knowledge about the properties of
the scene and the objects in it (e.g., shape,
color, illumination, layout). This hypothesis has
been strongly criticized by Gombrich (1960)
who agreed that visual artists may use spe-
cial techniques, but that those techniques do
not provide better perception to artists. Instead,
he argues that “making comes before match-
ing” (Gombrich, 1960, p. 99), so that an
artist would have to make a first draft and
to modify it afterward by comparing it to the
“original,” so that both are seen after visual con-
stancies are applied (to the perception of the
scene and separately to the perception of the
drawing).
VISUAL CONSTANCIES
Visual constancies are corrections made by the
visual system and allow a stable visual percep-
tion that attributes an object identity that is
invariant to the environmental circumstances of
viewing. However, the aim in realistic drawing
is not to capture that invariance, but rather to
make a snapshot of the physical world, where all
the objects are observed from a given point of
view at a certain distance from the artist, with
specific illumination. In contrast, non-realistic
drawing styles are not restricted to physical
constraints and, as one example, are free to
represent an object from different viewpoints
simultaneously (e.g., cubism). In the following
paragraphs, we will briefly describe examples of
visual constancies and their underlying mech-
anisms that may be crucial for the experience
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of objects and surfaces that remain invariant to
distance, viewpoint, and illumination.
Size constancy
The car’s size on our retina will decrease as
the car moves away from us. Yet, instead of
perceiving a car getting smaller we see it as
having the same size. This is size constancy.
This ability to accurately judge the size of an
object despite changes in retinal size (in visual
angle) is attributed to corrections made by the
visual system for the perceived distance. But
precisely because it depends on distance percep-
tion, it is also affected by cues to depth used
by the brain to estimate distance (Leibowitz
and Harvey, 1969; Day, 1972; Todorovic, 2002).
Such correction, for example, can lead to size
illusions when two objects having the same size
in a 2D image appear to be at two different
distances. In this case, the apparently closer
object appears smaller than the farther one (see
Figure 1 Stuart et al., 1993; Aks and Enns, 1996;
Bennett and Warren, 2002). Nevertheless, when
asked, subjects can attempt to judge the dis-
tal size of an object (how big is that car over
there) or to judge its retinal size (would it be
as big as my thumb if I held it out to block
the car). However, Rock (1983) showed that
Reflectance
The reflectance is the proportion of
incident light reflected at different
wavelengths of the spectrum and fully
depends on the surface material. It is
an object’s intrinsic property that is
independent from the intensity
and the wavelength of the ambient
illumination, and that gives, for
example, the surface color.
Luminance
The luminance is the product of the
illumination falling on the object’s
surface and the surface’s reflectance.
Low-level
Low- vs. high-level processing refers
to “bottom-up” vs. “top-down”
processing. Low-level mechanisms
depend directly on the sensory inputs
and do not need higher cognitive
processes (e.g., extracting shape from
the integration of lines and contours).
In contrast, high-level mechanisms call
on a variety of cognitive operations
(e.g., hypotheses made by the system
based on object and scene properties).
even when instructed to judge retinal size and
shown how to do it, the judgment is still biased
toward the distal, “perceived” size (Carlson,
1960, 1962).
Because an artist has to depict a 3-D scene
on a 2-D canvas, he or she has to employ
pictorial cues to capture the illumination and
depth in the scene, cues such as reflections,
shadows, relative size, linear perspective, and
elevation in the field (see in particular Solso,
1996). Moreover, embedded in these cues are
the depictions of objects that should match their
retinal size and luminance, if properly captured,
as if the artist were able to see them directly,
independently of the perceptual corrections that
then act on them. Our recent paper (Perdreau
and Cavanagh, 2011) asked whether, after years
of practice drawing distant objects as smaller
than nearby ones, as they are on the retina, do
visual artists judge the retinal size of objects any
better than non-artists.
Brightness constancy
Size constancy is only one of the corrections
made when we perceive the objects around
us. We also correct for the illumination falling
on them. Objects are perceived through the
light they reflect back to our retina. However,
the light falling on the retina (the proximal
stimulus) is the product of the object’s sur-
face reflectance (the distal stimulus) and the
ambient illumination (also distal) falling on
the object’s surface (Figure 1). Lightness corre-
sponds to the perceived reflectance (white vs.
black or light vs. dark) and brightness desig-
nates the perceived luminance (Adelson, 1993).
For example, the snow is rarely white but more
often blue or brown because of the light coming
from the sky or from trees. But, we ordinarily
see it as white. Our subjective percept of the
snow’s color (the perceived reflectance) remains
invariant whatever the ambient illumination
(Gilchrist, 1988; Moore and Brown, 2001).
Several studies described mechanisms explain-
ing how the visual system would estimate and
discount the illumination to recover the actual
surface reflectance (Gilchrist, 1988, 2006; Arend
and Spehar, 1993a,b; Adelson, 2000; Agostini
and Galmonte, 2002). Although lightness con-
stancy has attributed to low-level mechanisms
(e.g., a simultaneous contrast effect due to lat-
eral inhibition of retinal ganglion’s cells), in fact,
high-level processing of spatial configurations of
surfaces and light sources is required. For exam-
ple, if surfaces are seen within a cast shadow,
which decreases the luminance within its lim-
its, the visual system will attribute the change
of luminance due to the shadow to a change
in illumination and not a change in reflectance
(Gilchrist, 1988; Cavanagh and Leclerc, 1989).
In paintings, the artist can only vary the
reflectance of the canvas’ surface, and thus he or
she must pick the appropriate pigment to match
the actual object’s luminance. Thus, according
to Ruskin, an artist “sees the colors of nature
exactly as they are, and therefore perceives at
once in the sunlighted grass the precise relation
between the two colors that form its shade and
light” (Ruskin, 1912, p. 4). Our recent paper
also asked whether artists can better judge the
actual object luminance by ignoring ambient
illumination.
Amodal completion
Amodal completion, another case of perceptual
constancy (Rock, 1983), corresponds to an
inference or percept of a complete object
even though the retinal input of that object
is only partial. For example, when a square is
partially occluded by a circle, we still perceive
it as a square behind a circle and not as a
notched square (see Figure 1 Kanizsa, 1979,
1985). This completion effect has long been
described in terms of Gestalt configuration laws
(e.g., collinearity, Kellman and Shipley, 1991)
which are linked to low-level mechanisms (e.g.,
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FIGURE 1 | Cases of visual constancies. (1) Size constancy. In the left panel (1A), we perceive the distant man as
being as tall as the woman in the foreground. However, when the man is moved so that it appears to share the same
distance with the woman (right panel, 1A), he then looks much smaller than it was previously. This perception
corresponds to visual constancy. Because the retinal sizes of the two images of the man (panel 1B) are identical, the
visual system assigns smaller size to the closer figure. (2) Lightness constancy (adapted from Adelson, 1993).
Actually, squares A and B have identical luminance (same proximal property). However, because changes of
luminance on the board’s surface are attributed to a reduction of illumination due to the shadow casted by the
cylinder, also a similar change in luminance is attributed to B’s surface. Thus, the visual system automatically
compensates for this change and makes B appearing lighter than A. (3) Amodal completion. Panels in (3A) can be
interpreted either as a sphere occluding partially a cube or as a notched cube touching a sphere. This latter is harder
to see, for the presence of T-junctions (3B) is taken as cues for occlusion and depth by the visual system. Hence, the
brain extends the contours (dashed lines) to join them and to form a complete cube.
edge detection, orientation in V1, and solving
of “border-ownership” in V2 complex cells
Bruno et al., 1997; Rensink and Enns, 1998;
Tse, 1999; Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004). Shape
analysis has been described as a sequence of
stages from edges to parts (mosaic stage) to
the whole (completion stage) that produces a
viewpoint invariant percept (e.g., Biederman,
1987). But surprisingly, it has often been
demonstrated that the whole, the highest level
representation, is accessed earlier than the
parts (He and Nakayama, 1992; Rensink and
Enns, 1998; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Wolfe
and Horowitz, 2004). These results imply that
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object-level representations are the first to be
represented in conscious perception, and that it
takes longer to access the object’s parts because
the visual system has to “unbundle” them (Tse,
1999; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Lee and
Vecera, 2005). The third question we asked was
whether visual artists can ignore the completed
form of an object’s representation and access
the “mosaic” image of its parts (as they are
on the retina) and do this more quickly than
non-artists?
Perdreau and Cavanagh, 2011
Our earlier paper addressed whether visual
artists develop expertise in visual cognition that
includes access to earlier visual representations
unaffected by visual constancies. We ran three
experiments testing size, lightness constancy,
and amodal completion. The first two exper-
iments (size and lightness constancies) use a
matching-to-standard paradigm while the last
experiment (amodal completion) was a visual
search task. In all of these tasks, visual con-
stancies were introduced with the use of visual
context, perspective grids, cast shadows, and
occlusion (Day, 1972; Todorovic, 2002, 2010).
METHODS
Methods commonly used in research studies of
size, shape, and brightness constancies can be
categorized in two kinds: drawing tasks (e.g.,
Thouless, 1931; Lee, 1989; Mitchell et al., 2005)
and matching-to-standard tasks (e.g., Carlson,
1966; Leibowitz and Harvey, 1967). In drawing
tasks, subjects have to draw a target stimulus
presented within a specific visual context (e.g.,
perspective). This technique is not appropriate
to study the impact of visual constancies on an
artist’s perception, since it will also involve visu-
ally guided motor skills that are central to the
artist’s domain of expertise. For that reason, we
used the adjustment technique and presented
both the standard and the test stimuli simulta-
neously and without a time limit (Figure 2).
Our tasks required our subjects to adjust the
size (size task) or the luminance (lightness task)
of the standard stimulus to match the retinal
image and not the perceived property of the
standard stimulus. This is problematic because
subjects do not have an intuitive sense of “reti-
nal size” or “received luminance” as these are
usually corrected by visual constancies into per-
ceptions of object size or object surface color
(Carlson, 1966; Leibowitz and Harvey, 1969).
To make these judgments of “proximal” values
more direct and intuitive, we recast the tasks
to focus on the proximal values. Instructions
were “Please, make your adjustment so that the
height of the test cylinder corresponds to that
of the standard cylinder. Do it as if you were
measuring the cylinder’s size with your fingers
and only focus on the physical cylinder dis-
played on the screen.” For the lightness task,
we asked the subjects to “make the test patch’s
surface lighter or darker to match it with the
standard patch’s surface. In particular, imagine
that you could look at the surfaces through a
tube and ignore the presence or absence of the
surrounding shadowed region.”
Both the size and the lightness tasks used
a matching-to-standard task. The screen was
divided in two halves, the upper being the stan-
dard part, the lower the test part (Figure 2).
For the size task, a “standard” cylinder (upper
part) stayed over a background that could be
either a black line-drawn grid simulating a wall
(normal condition) or a black line-drawn cen-
tral perspective grid corresponding to a hallway
(context condition). Such a perspective display
includes several monocular cues to depth: linear
perspective, elevation-in-the-field, and texture
gradients (Ames, 1925; Bennett and Warren,
2002) that affect distance perception. Thus, a
cylinder lying on it may appear more distant
than the test stimulus that only lies on flat wall
grid. Therefore, for the same retinal size, the
cylinder would appear larger, unless the sub-
jects were able to ignore this context. In the
brightness task, the two parts presented identi-
cal boards textured with a wood surface with a
wood cylinder standing on it. On the standard
board (upper), the cylinder cast a shadow that
could either cover the standard patch (context)
or falling beside (normal). On the test board,
there was no cast shadow.
Finally, to disentangle whether the artist’s
advantage comes from an uncorrected initial
perception (Ruskin, 1912), as compared to the
use of strategies that undo constancies after
the fact (Gombrich, 1960), we used a visual
search task adapted from Rensink and Enns’
experiment (Rensink and Enns, 1998). This task
allowed us to measure the processing speed of
each item in the search array. This processing
speed can differentiate an automatic, parallel,
and fast analysis from an attentive, serial, and
slow analysis (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). In
our task, the target was a green- or red-notched
square that was accompanied either by a dis-
tant circle (normal) or by a contacting circle
(context). The distractors (a different number
on each trial, ranging from 2 to 12) were green
or red circles with a missing quarter accompa-
nied by distant (normal) or contacting (context)
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FIGURE 2 | Visual constancies tasks. (1) Size constancy task. Subjects were asked to adjust the height of a
“test” cylinder so that it matches the “standard” cylinder’s size, which could be either on a simple grid (normal) or a
perspective grid (context) background, and were instructed to make their settings as if they were measuring the
cylinder with their fingers on the screen. (2) Lightness constancy task. Subjects were instructed to match the
“test” patch’s luminance to the actual “standard” patch’s luminance, and were explicitly told to ignore the presence
of the cast shadow (context) surrounding the standard patch, as if they were looking through a tube and seeing only
the gray patch. The standard patch could be either outside a cast shadow (normal) or within it (context). (3) Amodal
completion task. The task was to search for a notched square among squares and circles and report the notched
square’s color (red or green). Some of the circles also had notches. In the normal (mosaic) condition, the target was
far from its companion circle, as were the Pacman-like, notched distractor circles, and their companion squares. In
the context condition, the notched square abutted its companion circle, and the notched circles abutted their
companion squares, so that the shapes appeared completed behind the overlapping shapes. In particular, the target
appeared to be a full square partially hidden behind a circle, camouflaging its notched shape.
squares (Figure 2). The subjects’ task was to
report the target’s color as quickly and accu-
rately as possible. When the target, the notched
square, was in contact with its adjacent circle,
it would appear to be a complete square par-
tially occluded by a circle (He and Nakayama,
1992; Rensink and Enns, 1998), making it quite
difficult to find among all the actually com-
plete, distractor squares. If artists can access
earlier representation of shape that would be
unaffected by amodal completion the notched
square should be very distinctive among all the
complete squares, making it easy to find no
matter how many distractors are present (par-
allel processing). However, if they do not have
access to the raw image, each square-like shape
has to be scrutinized individually to discover
the notched one and the processing rate (the
increase in reaction time with the number of
distractors) will be quite slow.
For these three tasks, we divided our sub-
jects into three distinct groups: non-artists,
art students, and professional artists. The 14
non-artists were recruited from a database of
voluntary subjects and they reported that they
had no training in any visual arts [9 females,
mean age: 23]. The nine art students were
recruited from the École des Beaux Arts in
Paris [6 females, mean age: 22 years]. Finally,
the 14 professional artists were recruited from
galleries, workshops, and international artists
associations [9 females, mean age: 39 years].
At the beginning of the experiment, we first
gathered information about each subject’s train-
ing in visual arts. Then, each ran the three
tasks in a random order. All the art students
and professional artists reported having a formal
training as well as continuous practice in visual
arts. In particular, their training included obser-
vational drawing and painting. Over the three
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groups, experience in visual arts ranged from 0
(novices) to 41 years.
WHAT HAPPENED
This section summarizes the results we found
in our earlier study and details about the statis-
tics may be found in the corresponding paper
(Perdreau and Cavanagh, 2011).
In both the size and the lightness tasks, we
computed the mean settings for both the con-
text and the normal conditions and looked at
the ratios of the mean CONTEXT response over
the mean NORMAL response (Figure 3). All the
ratios were significantly greater than 1, indicat-
ing that the subjects’ judgments were strongly
affected by the visual context. Nevertheless,
we found no significant differences between
the groups’ ratios. In both tasks, the artists’
judgments were just as affected by the contexts
as those of the non-artists. There was no effect
of expertise on perception. Moreover, the corre-
lation between the subjects’ years of experience
in drawing and the context’s effect on their
perceptual judgments was not significant.
Finally, to evaluate the effort put by the
subject to perform the task, we analyzed their
response times in the size and lightness tasks.
Interestingly, we found that art students and
professional artists spent significantly more time
to make their judgments, taking, respectively,
15.4 and 15.9 s against 8.6 s for the non-artists
in the size task, and, respectively, 11.4 and 14.3 s
FIGURE 3 | Mean ratios in the three experiments. The expected performance if subject could access the proximal
value (the retinal image) uncorrected by visual constancies is given by the ratio of “1” on each graph. Error bars are
95% confidence intervals. The graphs show the proximal value for the stimulus on the right at the ratio of 1 and
estimates of the proximal values for size (1) and lightness (2) only. (1) Size constancy. There were no difference
between groups and they all showed an effect of the perspective on their perceptual judgment (ratios > 1). We
estimated the distal size by assuming a slant of 20◦ and so a distance to the cylinder of 58 cm vs. the screen’s
distance of 52 cm (estimates based on derivations in Todorovic, 2002). Distal size was therefore about 21% greater
than the proximal size. (2) Lightness constancy. Similarly, all the groups were strongly affected by the presence of
the cast shadow, and artists showed no advantage in this task. Distal luminance (lightness) was estimated by adding
the decrease in luminance due to the cast shadow (about 45%) onto the proximal luminance. (3) Amodal
completion. Artists were not better or faster at accessing the proximal shape of the target (notched square). All the
groups were strongly influenced (about 50% of context effect) by amodal completion triggered by the contact
between the target shape and its companion circle. Even where visual artists showed a numerical (but
non-significant) advantage over non-artists (2), it was far from enough to completely undo the visual constancy
(ratio = 1) and so cannot fully explain the artist’s accuracy in drawings.
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against 9.7 s for the non-artists in the lightness
task.
In the visual search task (amodal comple-
tion), subjects’ slopes were significantly higher
in the context condition than in the normal con-
dition, indicating a strong effect of the context
on the subject’s search speed. Similarly to the
two other tasks, we computed ratios between the
mean response time in the context and the nor-
mal conditions (Figure 3) and all of them were
significantly greater than 1 showing a robust
slowing of the search due to the amodal comple-
tion. We again found no significant difference
between the groups indicating that artists had
no better access to the raw image where the
notched square would have been easy to find.
Finally, the correlation between subjects’ expe-
rience and the effect of the context was not
significant.
DISCUSSION
Our everyday perception needs to allow us to
act on our environment. This requires a sta-
ble visual perception of objects that are the
goals of our actions. This perceptual constancy
is given by the appropriate corrections made
by the visual system for changes in distance,
lighting, and viewpoint (Hochstein and Ahissar,
2002; Ahissar and Hochstein, 2004), the so-
called visual constancies. However, acting on
the world is not the artist’s aim when he or
she wants to represent it. Instead of perceiv-
ing a high-level description of the world, they
need to access low-level details (lines, orienta-
tions, visual directions). One could reasonably
expect that years of training in realistic visual
arts might modify the functional organization
of the visual system and allow artists to access
these low-level, early descriptions more directly.
Indeed, some studies reported that more skilled
subjects in drawing outperformed novices in
perceptual tasks (e.g., mental imagery, object
recognition, visual search for embedded fig-
ures, and Gestalt completion (Kozbelt, 2001;
Calabrese and Marucci, 2006), and that they
showed a lesser influence of shape constancy in
drawing and perceptual tasks (Thouless, 1932;
Cohen and Bennett, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2005;
Cohen and Jones, 2008). One reason for the
greater accuracy of artists could be that they can
access the raw image of an object, less influenced
by high-level corrections. However, it remains
unclear whether visual artists can really access
a proximal representation, and if this access
is direct or supposes some strategies to undo
the visual constancies afterward. Our results
(Perdreau and Cavanagh, 2011) suggest that
artists have no special abilities to undo visual
constancies and must deal with these automatic
corrections as any normal observer would.
Specifically, all the subjects in the three
experiments showed a strong effect of the con-
text on their perceptual adjustments, ranging
from 7 (size) to 50% (amodal completion)
with no advantage for the artists. In one task
(lightness), visual artists (students and profes-
sional) were numerically less influenced by the
presence of a cast shadow in the luminance
judgment, but they still showed an effect of con-
text of at least 30%, which is far from the 0%
needed for photorealistic drawing. Interestingly,
in both the size and the lightness tasks, art
students and professional artists spent much
more time to make their setting. If visual artists
were able to access an earlier, uncorrected rep-
resentation of the object, this task would have
been easier and faster for them than for non-
artists. Our results suggested that artists could
not access the standard stimulus’ property (size
or luminance) directly. Moreover, because our
method allowed the subjects to make contin-
uous adjustments of the test stimulus size or
luminance, it allowed them to make all the cor-
rections they felt necessary—as they would do
in a drawing task. This produced no increased
accuracy in their performances, strongly sug-
gesting that the artists’ advantage cannot be
explained by perceptual factors alone. The visual
search task’s results were in line with this find-
ing, for artists showed as the same effects of
context—the same slow-down for the camou-
flaged targets—as the non-artists. This echoes
Kozbelt’s study (2001) that showed that, when
predicting drawing accuracy from perceptual
performances, residuals of the regression still
distinguished artists from novices, suggesting
that non-perceptual processes such as visuomo-
tor skills might explain the artist’s advantage.
Although we found no perceptual advantages
for artists in our experiments, earlier studies
have reported some advantages. For example, a
number of studies showed that skilled draftsper-
sons outperformed novices in shape constancy
tasks, a task that we did not examine (Thouless,
1932; Mitchell et al., 2005; Cohen and Jones,
2008). However, recent studies failed to repli-
cate those findings (McManus et al., 2011;
Ostrofsky et al., 2012). Nevertheless, Ostrofsky
et al. (2012) did report an advantage for artists
in a size constancy task where we had found
none. Their artists showed a 15% effect of
context vs. a 20% effect for the non-artists.
Their size constancy task used more monocu-
lar cues to depth than ours (e.g., shading) and
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both the standard and the test stimuli were
presented within the same scene in contrast
to our experimental settings. These differences
may have increased the effect of context on dis-
tance perception, and this may explain some
of the effect they find. Whatever its source,
this decrease from 20 to 15% influence of con-
text on size judgments in the Ostrofsky et al.
study is far from the absence of effect (0%)
required for veridical representation, as sug-
gested by the authors and by Ruskin’s inno-
cent eye hypothesis (Ruskin, 1912). However,
as stated in previous studies that found a
link between drawing accuracy and perceptual
errors made in a visual constancy task (Mitchell
et al., 2005; Cohen and Jones, 2008; Ostrofsky
et al., 2012), a more likely hypothesis would be
that a reduction of constancy, and not a total
absence, is enough to result in a more accurate
drawing.
Nevertheless, what could be the source of
these discrepancies across studies? Indeed, even
studies using the same method did not find
similar results (e.g., Cohen and Jones, 2008;
McManus et al., 2011). One possible factor
is that the evaluation of drawing accuracy is
often done by non-experts according to sub-
jective criteria. A better approach would be to
use more objective measurements such as geo-
metrical and physical properties of the drawing
itself (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005; Carson et al.,
2012).
If our results do not prove the absence of dif-
ference between artists’ and novices’ perceptual
performances in our tasks, so that it remains
plausible that artists could be less influenced
by visual constancies, the results of the visual
search task, however, argue against the hypoth-
esis of a direct, veridical perception in visual
artists (Ruskin, 1912). Indeed, artists’ process-
ing time, and hence the time needed to access
the target representation, were as long as that
of novices. Although the better accuracy of
artists in drawing is part of what makes them
artists, one cannot attribute it solely to per-
ceptual expertise. Moreover, the fact that our
artist subjects took almost twice the time to
perform our matching tasks (size and lumi-
nance) than our non-artists suggests that they
attempted to apply some strategies to over-
come the effect of visual constancies, strate-
gies that are often part of an artist’s training.
One could argue that they were more moti-
vated by this challenge to their specialized abil-
ities, but so, this was in vain, since they were
as much affected by context as non-artists.
One explanation for the veridicality of artists’
representations, of the seeming independence
from visual constancies, is Gombrich’s model
of schemata (Gombrich, 1960). Visual artists
are like copyists: they must start with the same
corrected and biased perception as anyone, but
they apply it to both the scene and their draw-
ing. They then correct progressively their sketch
so that it matches the scene they are paint-
ing. This latter hypothesis is closer to descrip-
tions of how artists work (Locher, 2010). This
mode of drawing—matching the percepts in
the original and on the drawing—does not
make artists any better at discounting the visual
constancies. Therefore, since neither approach
(perceptual vs. cognitive) improved the artists’
access to the veridical retinal image, we must
assume that special expertise in perception of
the scene, either directly or following cogni-
tive corrections, is not the source of artists’
accuracy.
Finally, as suggested in our earlier study
(Perdreau and Cavanagh, 2011), this absence
of difference between artists and non-artists
could be due to the nature of our tasks. They
were indeed only perceptual and might have
not required mechanisms ordinarily called on
during the drawing process. A recent study
suggested, however, that artist’s advantage is
not domain-specific but might transcend the
requirements of drawing, so that artists become
expert in visual cognition in general and,
as such, they might outperform novices in
perceptual tasks related to drawing (Glazek,
2012).
Our results suggest that the artist’s advan-
tage is not based on a direct access to early
visual representations. As an alternative, we
have begun to examine whether their accuracy
arises from the way they analyze and represent
an object’s structure. In particular, the draw-
ing process is never completed all at once but
requires iterative processing of the stimulus as
the drawing progresses. This is reflected by
many eye movements alternating between the
“original” and the “copy,” where the eye move-
ment targets are highly dependent on motor
constraints of the drawing hand—its current
position on the drawing and where it can move
next (Tchalenko and Miall, 2008; Coen Cagli
et al., 2009). This may indicate that to ren-
der an object accurately, one dissects it into
smaller parts for reproduction while respecting
the spatial organization within and between all
the object’s parts in order to capture the object’s
spatial layout and proportion. Thus, our cur-
rent hypothesis is that years of practice in visual
arts lead artists to better encode each object’s
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structure in order to facilitate its reproduc-
tion. This is guided by a better understanding
of what should be selected and encoded from
the object, such as structural features (junc-
tions or vertices, Kozbelt, 2001; Biederman and
Kim, 2008; Kozbelt et al., 2010; Ostrofsky et al.,
2012) and their spatial positions and relation-
ships. Above all, this expertise needs to be opti-
mized in a form that best guides the final motor
production. The structure of the original encod-
ing should ultimately respect the visuomotor
mapping required to produce the final trac-
ing (Seeley and Kozbelt, 2008; Tchalenko, 2009;
Glazek, 2012).
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